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Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 9, 111-128 (1991)

Power Imbalances .in
Therapeutic and Forensic
Relationships
Michael L. Perlin, J.D.
This article examines the ways that power imbalances
affect relationships in the forensic mental disability system
and between therapists and their clients. It considers the
impact of the "dual loyalty" dilemma on forensic relationships, the manner in which courts deal with this dilemma,
and suggests several points of commonality that arise
aJ;"ound such power conflicts. It also examines recent litigation involving therapeutic relationships, and attempts to
extract doctrinal threads from these cases. Finally, it
recommends that, in order for the judicial system to
attempt to correct any of the underlying imbalances, courts
and jurors must openly come to grips with the psy~hodynamic issues that underlie these imbalances.

I. INTRODUCTION
1

l'he legal system is, at its base, about the allocation of power, and the existence
2
of power relationships: relationships between the state and individuals, between
the federal government and the states,3 and between the legislature and the judici4
ary, Almost every significant Supreme Court case involves questions dealing with
Power relationships, with the distribution of power and the limits of power. Consider
Michael L. Perlin, J.D., is Professor of Law at New York Law School. An earlier draft of this paper
;as_Presented at the University of Pennsylvania Department of Psychiatry Conference on Legal and
n~cal Issues in Mental Health, November 1990, Philadelphia, PA. 1?e author_~sh_es to thank Debbie
Li rfman for her helpful research assistance, Bob Sadoff and Alan Tomkins for their ms1ghtful suggestions
r ~da Perlin for helping me come to understand many of the underlying issues, and two anonymou;
yVJewers for their recommendations. Address reprint requests and correspondence to the author at New
orkLaw School, 57 Worth Street, New York, NY 10013, USA.
I

:;e ~rgume~t is made most powerfully in Cover, Violen_ce and the Wo~d, 95 Y".1-E L. J. 1601 (1986).
12
e;)~ work 1s carefully considered in Sherwin, Law, Violence, and Illiberal B elief, 78 GEO. L.J. 1785
O99

Ii The issue is discussed in, inter alia, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 514 (1969) (power of
cfuse of Representatives to exclude member); Atkins v. United States, 556 F .2d 1028, 1067 (Ct.
13 · .19 77), cert. den., 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (justiciability of case involving federal judge pay scale) ·
in:~k v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351 , 307 A.2d 571, 594 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973) (rule~
reh' ng power of state Supreme Court); People v. Kaedin~, 98 ~ll.2d 237, 456 N .E.2d 11, 17 (1983),
Ill g den. _(1983) (allocation of treatment power in cases mvolvmg defendants adjudicated "guilty but
F:;tally 111"). On the manner in which jurisdictional decisions reflect power allocations, see M. REDISH,
' Se E~ JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN 1HE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980) .
, s e 1.nfra notes 8-9 .
• See 1_nfra notes 7, 12.
ee 1nfra note 11 .
~i~-3936/91/020111-18$09.00
91 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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variously the power of a President to seize a company's steel mill at a time of national
emergency,5 the power of the federal courts to force states to desegregate their
6
school systems or private business enterprises to desegregate their public facilities,
the power of the federal courts to deprive state prosecutors of the ability to use
evidence against a criminal suspect that was obtained by methods that violated
the Constitution, 7 the power of a state to interfere with a woman's right to reproductive autonomy8 or a couple's right to practice consensual sodomy in their
home,9 the power of a President to shield certain documents from public view,1°
the power of the federal courts to order state legislatures to reapportion, 11 or the
power of the states to impose the death penalty. 12
In other less well-known contexts, courts and scholars have begun to critically
examine the existence of inherent imbalances of power in certain other relationships;
13
for instance, the relationship between a franchise dealer and a manufacturer,
14
between an employer and an employee, between sexual offenders and child victims, 15 between students and university administrators, 16 between attorneys and
clients,1 7 between clergy and penitents, 18 and between criminal defendants and
the prosecution. 19 Others have expanded this inquiry to consider the imbalances
in any cross-gender relationships, 20 or, even, in the full range of all relationships
that exist in "social reality. " 21 Often, power imbalance issues emerge most pointedly
in those cases where one party is dependent on the other through underlying professional, personal or social associations. 22
For the purposes of this article, I wish to focus specifically on power imbalance
issues that flow from three specific kinds of cases: (1) the institutionalization of
putatively mentally ill individuals, (2) the trial of mentally disabled criminal defendants, and (3) the legal regulation of mental health practice. While scholars variously
couch their discussion of these cases in such terms as balancing the police power
with due process, or police power with parens patriae interests, or professional au ton-

' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
6
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
7
Miranda v. Arizona, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8
Roev. Wade,410U.S. 113 (1973) .
9
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
11
Bakerv. Carr, 369 U .S. 186 (1962).
12
Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (unconstitutionality of death penalty), to Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of death penalty statutes).
13
Monmouth Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 102 N .J. 485, 509 A.2d 161 (1986).
14
Rudow v. NYC Commission on Human Rights, 123 Misc.2d 709, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct.
1984); General Drivers, Helpers & Truck Terminal Employees v. City of St. Paul, 270 N.W.2d 877
(Minn. 1978).
15
Mindlin, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of Limitation: A Model for Reform, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 189 (1991) .
16
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
17
In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1986).
18
State v. Dunon, 450 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
19
Resnik, The Federal Rules in Practice: The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2219 (1989) .
20
Bender, Gender Equality in the Legal Profession: Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality, 57 FORD. L.
REv. 941 (1989).
21
West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990).
22
Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair Advantage of the "Fair Sex," 53 ALB·
L. REV. 95, 96 (1988).
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omy with personal privacy rights, paring the competing values to their core reveals
that these cases all reflect allocations of power.
Power allocations in these three general areas may manifest themselves in a myriad
of concrete situations. For example, there are allocations between a committing
agency and an individual who wishes to resist commitment, 23 or between a state
department of mental health and an institutionalized individual seeking either to
vindicate her right to treatment or to interpose her right to refuse treatment, 24
or between a prosecutor seeking to make use of a statement admitting to guilt by
a mentally disabled defendant who wishes to resist its introduction into evidence
(in that it does not reflect the product of a "free will") and that defendant, 25 or
between a forensic mental health professional wishing to testify as to a defendant's
"future dangerousness" (thus making him amenable to capital punishment in certain
iurisdictions) and the resisting defendant, 26 or between a tort plaintiff charging
her therapist with sexual manipulation and the therapist arguing that the patient's
claims are nothing more than misplaced transference, 27 or between an assault victim
alleging that a therapist should have somehow prevented the assault and the perpetrator's therapist arguing that principles of confidentiality "trump" any duty to warn
or protect. 28
And yet, we tend to view these cases from very different perspectives. We characterize them as involving questions of professional autonomy, "turf' issues, public safety
considerations and matters of competing fundamental constitutional interests. What
We seem to skip over is how all of these cases involve questions of power. In some
instances, they involve the power that a state can exert over a mentally disabled

'.' See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The underlying issues are considered

\? this context in Bagby, The Deprofessiortalization of Civil Commitment, 29 CAN• PSYCHOLOGIST 234 (1988).

See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). (right to treatment); Youngberg v. Romeo,
45 7 U.S. 307 (1982) (right to freedom from bodily harm); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.
19 83) (right of civil patients to refuse treatment); Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (right
gfprisoner to refuse treatment) .
26 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U .S. 157 (1986).
27 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
,, See Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (C.A. 1961).
See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 551- P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 Cl 976) .
. In this context, the word "trump" is used to denote the supremacy of one right or duty over another
~ght or duty. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 911
·2d 1331, 1347 (9th Cir. l 990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part):
The fact is, the Constitution protects a variety of rights and liberties and reasonable minds
might differ as to the relative importance of each. When we relegate certain of these to collateral
status by refusing to give them the full measure of constitutional protection, we undermine
the integrity of the constitutional structure and hand a potent weapon to those who may
S
not share our vision al to which rights trump which.
,~e also Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REv. l, 13 n.11 (1987)
( a Utilitarian political morality could not recognize a general right to liberty as a trump over utilitarian
~lcu!ations of overall social advantage"). The principle is applied in, inter alia, IRS v. Federal Labor
Mla~ons Authority, 110 S. Ct. 1623, 1627 (1990) (labor-management grievances); Lamb v. Phillip
0
. ~s, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 n . 12 (6th Cir. 1990) (legislative history analysis); West-Texas Trans~ss~on, L.P. v. Enron Corp., 907 F.2d 1554, 1559 (5th Cir. 1990) (gas pipeline repurchase) Walker
p' <;:ity of Kansas City, Mo., 911 F.2d 80, 95 (8th Cir. 1~9?) (ordinance regulating "go-go" bars);
l
The "Rule of Reason" in AntitruSt Law: Praperty Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS
· · 285 (1989) (antitrust implications of railroad stock purchase).

e;tt,
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individual, but they also involve the question of the exertion of power by a mental
health professional over a mentally disabled individual.
The fact that these issues involve power allocations is enormously important.
What is perhaps even more important is the fact that the whole question of power- of
power balances and imbalances, of the use and exploitation of power, of the inevitability of power relationships- is so underdiscussed and underconsidered in this particular context. If Jonas Robitscher was correct when he argued a decade ago that the
psychiatrist is the "most important nongovernmental decisionmaker in modern
29
life," and if Alfred Adler was correct when he argued that the drive for power
was the single most important factor in determining man's behavior, 30 mental health
professionals and the public at large both have to reflect on the special irony we
face here. While we professionally understand fully the importance of power, while
we politically know that mental health professionals have the capacity to exert tremendous power, and while we legally see that so many of the questions with which
we deal in this area are bottomed on allocations of power, the basic power questions
that pervade all of these relationships are still rarely explored. 31
I will attempt to consider these questions in the following manner. In the section
on ForeO:sic Relationships, I will look at power balances and imbalances that are
peculiar to the forensic relationship, adopting, for these purposes, Paul Appelbaum's
limiting definition, construing such forensic relationships to apply to interactions
the purpose of which "is to convey information to one or. more third parties concerning the subject of the evaluation. " 32 I will consider briefly the dilemmas of "dual
loyalties" first articulated 16 years ago by Jerome Shestack, 33 the way some of
the conflicts are treated by the courts, and the way some thoughtful forensic mental
health professionals have suggested that the underlying problems can be dealt with.
In the section on Therapeutic Relationships, I will look at both global and specific
power imbalances that stem from the therapeutic relationship. In conclusion, I will
examine judicial attitudes towards the underlying issues, in an effort to try to determine whether there is any sort of doctrinal coherence to this whole area, explain
the types of reasoning processes that seem to- animate judicial decisionmakers here,
and predict expected future developments.

29

See J. ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 8 ( 1980). See also Brodsky, Ethical Issues For Psychologists
in Corrections, in WHO IS THE CLIENf? THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INrERVENfION INfO THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 63, 74 (J. Monahan ed. 1980) (discussing potential for abuse in "the considerable
power that exists in psychology for controlling and shaping individuals' behavior").
30
A. ADLER, THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF INDMDUAL PSYCHOLOGY 209 (A. Radin trans. 1951), as
quoted in S. HALLECK, THE POLITICS OF THERAPY 261 (1971).
~• Fo~ instan~e, in neither of two of the most important contemporary psychiatric works on ethical issues
m this field 1s there even a subject matter listing in the index for "power" or "coercion." See LAW
AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (C. Hofling ed. 1981); A. DYER, ETHICS AND PSYCHIATRY:
TOWARD PROFESSIONAL DEFINIJ'ION (1985). Only one reference is made in Dyer's book to "double
agentry." A. DYER, supra, at 6&-69. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46. A WESTI.AW®computer
search ~conduct_ed on November 15, 1990) revealed only one civil case litigated in the last decade that
deals directly with the underlying questions: an opinion that considered whether a state hospital could
ban a parent from speaking to his institutionalized daughter where the facility's doctors believed that
such communication conflicted with the therapy being employed. See Doe v. Public Health Trust of
Dade County, 696 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1983), holding that the hospital's non-communication policy
"trumped" the parent's right to communicate with his child.
:: Appelbaum, Corlfidentiality in the Forensic evaluation, 7 Im'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 285, 289 (1984).
See Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, 60 A.B.A. J. 1521 (1974).
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II. FORENSIC RELATIONSHIPS
The most modest deconstruction 34 of the phrase "forensic relationship" reveals
the presenting dilemma: by its very nature, the "forensic relationship" is an unbalanced one. The forensic mental health professional is not, after all, "seeing a patient"
for therapeutic purpose. Instead, she is intervening on behalf of the litigation, economic or administrative needs of one of a series of third parties-an attorney, the
court, a prosecuting agency, a state mental health facility, an insurance company,
an army. But for these external actors, the forensic relationship would not-could
not-exist. 35 There can be no pretense, for instance, (1) that absolute confidentiality
applies at the forensic interview, 36 or (2) that the mental health professional is
Present to provide treatment. 37
·
Having said that, however, the inquiry into these two distinctions cannot come
to an end. The mere fact that absolute confidentiality does not apply does not end
consideration of that question; it is necessary for the evaluator to realize that the
subject might still have legitimate expectations of confidentiality beyond what must
~e disclosed as within the material scope of the evaluation, 38 and that the subject
is entitled to be informed of the level of confidentiality that will apply in the forensic
relationship. 39 Beyond the threshold question of whether the interviewee is competent to give informed consent to a clinical assessment, 40 collateral confidentiality
questions must also be weighed by the evaluator: has the interviewee consented
to the evaluation (in those instances where concepts of informed consent apply)? 41
!"Ias the interviewer considered whether she has an obligation of reciprocity (that
is, should she, can she, must she) _tell the interviewee about information that she
?as gleaned from third parties? 42 Answers to these dilemmas are rarely spelled out
in case law or in statutes, and it is important that the forensic evaluator realize
that she may have to answer them.
This relationship may still contain therapeutic content. If the legal relationship

,,
Se~ have recen_tly tried other similarly modest deconstructions in ?th~r ar~as_of mental disability l~w.
S ' e.g., Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions. Stnppmg the Facade from United
dates v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L . REV. 957, 967-68 (1990) (deconstructing "competency"); Perlin,
t'"Petency, !Jeinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A ~tory of Marginaliz~tion, 28 ~ous. L. REv. 63
9.1) (Perlm, Competency) (same); M . Perlin, "Morality a~~ Pre~extuality,,,Psychiatry ~nd Law: Of
dinary
Common Sense,' Heuristic Reasoning, and Cogmttve Dissonance (paper delivered to the
19 9
• oannual conference of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law) (deconstructing "pretextuality"
:e~tal disability law and litigation).
CluAeiner, Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry: From an Attorney's Perspective, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. Psv,, I\ TRY & L. 253, 254 (1984).
.
.
.
of .J>Pelbau~,
note ?2, a_t 287-90. In a rela~ed vem,_H~rbert Modlm _p?mts out that th<; exercise
fre self-scrun~y 1s especially important to forensic p_sychiarr:ists, whose opm1o_ns and conclus1ons "are
Ps quentiy subiect to public scrutiny." Modlin, Forensic Psychiatry and Malpractice, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD.
37:~IATRY&L. 153,162 (1990).
"I\ einer, supra note 35, at 253-54.
,, I?. Ppelbaum, supra note 32, at 289-90.
su epon of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, in J. Monahan, ed.,
a;f';a note 29, at 1, 5. Monahan's inquiry is considered carefully in Lyon & Levine, Ethics, Power,
"'R..:dvocacy:_Psyc~ology in the CriminalJustic~ System, 6 LAw & HUM . BEHAV. 65 (1982).
<t S gers, Ethical Dilemmas in Forensic Evaluations, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 149, 154 (1987).
Monahan, supra note 29, at 6-7.
.
. .
.
.
1'he gers! supra note 40, at 155-56. On the 1mplicat1ons of Tarasojffor forensic relattonships, see Note,
A.pP!ication of the Tarasojf Duty to Forensic Psychiatry, 66 VA. L. REv. 715 (1980).

~!

!~

s~ta
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and the due process hearing have a therapeutic content, 43 it would be unseemly to
suggest that contact with an evaluating mental health professional is definitionally
devoid of such content. The fact that there may be some therapeutic content "raises
the ante" as to force an assessment of whether the presence of this content may be
inherently meretricious. Regardless, the potentiality of this pr~sence cannot obscure
some of the fundamental characteristics that are unique to the forensic relationship.
Indeed, given the omnipresence of a third party, it is necessary to begin with
the proposition that, definitionally, any forensic relationship contains a power imbalance, because of the pervasive dangers of "dual loyalties, " 44 or, more provocatively,
of "double agentry. " 45 While the dangers stemming from this dual role may be
different in differing circumstances (depending in large part on the motives of the
forensic mental health professional's employer), the question to be asked is the same
one first asked by Shestack:
Can the psychiatrist be both the agent of the patient and of the institution that
employs him? [W]hom is the psychiatrist supposed to represent?46
Again, we can identify a plethora of conflict-laden situations: 47
-a doctor employed by a public hospital interviewing an individual who faces
civil commitment or an NGRI acquittee who is petitioning for release;
-a court clinic mental health professional examining defendants prior to the
imposition of sentence;
-a psychiatrist on contract to an insurance company examining beneficiaries
who allege psychic stress or trauma;
-a school district mental health professional who evaluates a "problem" student
to determine whether suspension or expulsion or transfer is the appropriate disposition;
43

See, e.g., Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Wa,ren Burger's
"Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY ~
L. 149 (1976). Legal scholars are now beginning to critically investigate the question of how seriously
(if at all) legal rules impair the functioning of the mental health system. See, e.g., Schopp & Wexler,
Shooting Yourself in the Foot With Due Care, 17 J . PSYCHIATRY & L. (1989); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
THE LAw AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (D. Wexler ed. 1990). For a recent listing of the relevant literature,
see Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous .
. ~- REv. n. 150 (1991).
Shestack, supra note 33, at 1521 .
45
Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas of Forensic Psychiatry: A Utilitarian Approach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD . PSYCHIATRY & L. 279, 279 (1984).
The most pointed judicial exchange on this issue is found in United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.), on the question of the admissibility of statements made by a defendant
to a court-appointed psychiatrist tending to negate his insanity defense. Compare id. at 1115 (no violation
of defendant's right against self-incrimination when defendant raised insanity defense), to id. at 1152-53
(Bazelon, J., dissenting):

The government psychiatrist is armed with the same technical expertise as the private psychiatrist.
He is trained to gain the confidence of a patient. As a medical doctor, the psychiatrist is conceived
of as a healer, a participant in a voluntary therapeutic alliance directed to the patient's benefit.
Unlike the policeman, whose goals and methods engender wariness in the defendant, the government psychiatrist in the state hospital engenders trust. But this trust is unwarranted. The psychiatrist's aim is diagnosis, not therapy. His primary commitment is to his institution, not to his
patient. Given these concerns, I must conclude that the court-ordered psychiatrist examination
poses a threat of coercion similar to that in the interrogation deemed unconstitutional in Miranda.
(footnotes omitted).
46
Shestack, suprp note 33, at 1521.
47
See generally Halleck, supra note 45, at 280.
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-the army psychiatrist examining a "troublemaker" soldier who faces a "Section
8" discharge;
-the private hospital doctor in a for-profit facility being pressured to maintain
census levels;
-a forensic witness evaluating defendants for purposes of sentencing in potential
death penalty cases (or, perhaps, testifying on the basis of hypotheticals in such
matters), for purposes of evaluating competency to stand trial, or for purposes
of evaluating criminal responsibility;
-a prison psychiatrist weighing a prisoner's right to refuse the imposition of psychotropic medication; or even,
-an examining witness retained by an attorney for a civil plaintiff or a criminal
defendant whose opinion is sought either as to a question of competency, or
as to the question of the presence of damages in a "psychiatric tort" case, or
as to the viability of a mental status defense.
All of these disparate situations include some important points in common. First,
there is a multiplicity of interests being represented. Beyond the potentially conflicting interests of the forensic mental health professional's employer, and the additional
set of variables to be considered in weighing the specific ethical proscriptions for
lawyers dealing with forensic experts, 48 the forensic evaluator may also weighconsciously or unconsciously-community, social and political values (for example,
in determining whether a notorious insanity acquittee should be given conditional
release), 49 or the availability of public hospital space or potential fear of liability
50
in weighing the need for involuntary civil commitment. Ben Bursten sees the
Problem even more broadly. In his view, any decision as to whether any behavior
is a product of mental illness is not a matter of scientific expertise, "but a matter
of social policy. " 51
This was conceded in a report done by an NIMH advisory committee in the
Wake of the Hinckley acquittal, acknowledging that, "in controversial cases," the
government "can be counted upon to oppose any conditional release recommendation. " 52 In the civil context, we are now also beginning to consider seriously how
Patients' families feel about civil commitment; since early empirical surveys show
that relatives now dramatically fav~r longer terms of commitment and less restrictive
commitment standards and that they specifically express the need for the "assignment
of a professional" to aid them in coping with their family member's commitment
Procedures, 53 it is likely that this additional, potentially conflicting interest will
also raise questions of further forensic imbalances.
Second, it is possible that the individual at risk may suffer harm as a result of
his participation in the evaluation process. This is most pointed in the situation
48

See Fitch, Petrella & Wallace, Legal Ethics and the Use of Mental Health Experts in Criminal Cases,

?. BEHAVIORAL SCI. &L. 105, 109-16 (1987) .

See Shestack, supra note 33, at 1522.
Thompson & Ager, An Experimental Analysis of the Civil Commitment Recommendations of Psychologists
~nd Psychiatrists, 6 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 1 i 9, 120 (1988).
B. BURSTEN, BEYOND PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTISE 167 (1984).
52
~erlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE WES.
H. · L. ~ - 59_9 , 671 (1989-90), quoting Final Report of the National Institute of Mental Health Ad
oc Forensic Advisory Panel, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIS~ILITY L. ~P. 7?, _96 (1988) (emphasis added).
53
McFarland, Faulkner, Bloom, Hallaux & Bray, Family Members Opinions About Civil Commitment
41 Hosp_& COMMUNITY PsYCHIATRY 537,539 (1990).
'
,

0
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where a forensic expert evaluates a defendant to determine whether he is competent
54
to be executed, and it is in this context that forensic professionals have begun
to debate whether they should be involved at all in the underlying process. 55 However, the potential for harm (albeit, lesser harm) to the subject in virtually every
other forensic context should also be clear.
Third, some of the harm that may befall the patient may flow directly from the
mental health professional's employment of skills designed to help individuals (and
thus the earlier caveat as to how the interaction's "therepeutic content" may "raise
the ante" for the patients). As Dr. Seymour Halleck has asked: "Is it morally justified
to use skills originally developed for the sole purpose of helping patients in order
to derive information that ultimately may be used to hurt them?" 56 During the
data-gathering process, the mental health professional may thus use his empathic
skills to "seduce the subject into revealing deleterious information" he might not
otherwise reveal. 57
Fourth, unless the mental health professional acknowledges (consciously and
openly) the existence of this potentially tainted relationship, it is likely that power
imbalances will tilt even further to the institutional side. As an example, the recent
United States Supreme Court case of Buchanan v. Kentucky 58 allowed a prosecutor
to rebut an "extreme emotional disturbance" defense by using the contents of a
report prepared as part of a determination as to whether a pre-trial detainee was
eligible for transfer to a hospital setting so as to be psychiatrically treated. Use
of the report was sanctioned, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had not
been informed that data he gave to evaluators in determining his amenability to
treatment might be used against him in the prosecution of the underlying homicide
case.59 Again, if the subject is not informed fully of the imbalance in the "relationship" with the forensic examiner, decisions such as Buchanan will be inevitable.
Fifth, there exists an "identification bias" through which, as a result of a witness's
unconscious identification with one "side" of a legal battle or his more conscious
identification with a particular value system or set of ideological leanings, his "secret
hope for victory for his own opinion [may lead to] innumerable subtle distortions

54

Compare Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U .S. 399 (1986) (execution of a mentally ill prisoner violates the
Eighth Amendment), to Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (Eighth Amendment does notrequire
blanket ban proscribing execution of mentally retarded prisoners) . See also Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S.
Ct. 449 (1990), which vacated and remanded the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision allowing the
State to administer antipsychotic medication to a death row inmate so as to make him competent to
be executed, in light of the Court's decision in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (articulating
limits on right of prisoners to refuse antipsychotic medication) . See generally 3 M. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§17.02-17.06 (1989) & §l 7.06A (1990 pocket part).
" Compare Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscientious Abstention, Professional
Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1990), to Brodsky, Professional
Ethics and Professional Morality in the Assessment of Competence for Execution, _14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
91 (1990), to Bonnie, Grounds for Professional Abstention in Capital Cases: A Reply to Brodsky, 14 LAW
&HUM. BEHAV. 99 (1990).
56
Halleck, supra note 45, at 280.
" Appelbaum, Psychiatric Ethics in the Courtroom, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 225,229 (1984) .
58
107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987) .
59
The relationship berween Buchanan and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (applying Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to uncounseled pretrial psychiatric examination in case where insanity def ense_ was
not raised) is explored in 3 M. PERLIN, supra note 54, §16.04A, at 425-29, 434-35, and in Perlin,
Admissibility of Psychiatric Evaluations Under Miranda and the Right to Counsel: Satterwhite and Buchanan,
15 SEARCH &SEIZURE L. REP. 73 (1988).
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and biases in his testimony that spring from this wish to triumph. " 60 As a result,
we find a positive influence of political ideology in forensic examiners' assessments
of insanity defense claims61 and of civil psychic trauma allegations, 62 an influence
that has to be considered in light of the possibility that, in a whole variety of factsettings, social bias frequently "infects and hides behind scientific judgments. " 63
Recently, for instance, a research study revealed that a patient's sex, color and sexual
orientation may control, to a significant degree, whether a physician decides to breach
confidentiality and reveal that a patient carries the AIDS virus. 64 The problem
here is heightened when we consider the evidence that (1) many forensic experts
misunderstand the basic relevant standards for such legal constructs as "insanity"
or "incompetency to stand trial," 65 and (2) that legal and social service agencies
are often unclear as to the express purpose for which the evaluation was sought
in the first place. 66
Sixth, there may be economic issues to consider as well. There is already some
evidence that the recent dramatic increase in for-profit private psychiatric hospitals
under corporate ownership has led to an increased number of children admitted
to such facilities at a time when some physicians are under pressure to maintain
a maximal census and thus increase profits. 67 The potential that this pressure can
distort forensic evaluations on questions of hospital admissions and releases is yet
another power imbalance that we need to confront.
Seventh, we must consider recent evidence demonstrating that, in response to
legislative actions tightening involuntary civil commitment criteria, some forensic
mental health professionals answered by suggesting that such legal mandates could
comfortably be ignored 68 where they conflicted with the witness' "moral judgment,"
Where they were "tyrannical," or where .they would lead to a too "literal" interpretation of the law. 69 Dr William McCormick, for instance, has quoted an anonymous
60

Diamond, The Fallacy of che Impartial Experc, 3 .ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNAMICS 221, 222 (1959),
as quoced in Goldstein, Hiring che Hired Guns: Lawyers and Their Psychiatric Expercs, 11 LEGAL Snm.
~ORUM 41 (1987); see also M. Perlin, supra note 34, manuscript at 13. .
.
.
See, e.g., Homant & Kennedy, Judgment of Legal Insanity as a Function of Acutude Toward che Insanity
. .
..
[?efense, 8 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 67 (1985).
Zusman & Simon, Differences in R epeaceq, Psychiatric Examinations of Lmgancs co a Lawsuic, 140 AM.
PSYCHIATRY 1300, 1302-04 (1983) .
Davis, Law, S cience and History: Reflections Upon In The Best Interests of the Child., 86 MICH. L.
Riiv. 1096, 1107 (1988), citing s. GouLD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21-22 (1981).
64
Physician Biases Found co Affecc Decision co Maintain Pau·ent Confidentiality, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Oct.
5, 1990, at 17 (research sample included 200 family practitioners, internists, obstetricians/gynecologists
~nd general practitioners residing in Tennessee).
~ogers, Turner, Helfield & Dickens, Forensic Psychiatrists' and Psychologiscs ' Understanding of Insantiy:
~isguided Expertise, 33 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 691 (1988).
Halleck, supra note 45, at 281.
67
Dalton & Foreman, Confiiccs of Inceresc Associated wich che Psychiatric Hospicalization of Children 57
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 12, 13 (1987);· see generally Schlesinger & Dorwart, Ownership and M;ntal
[!ealch Services, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 959 (1984) .
This is not to suggest that all evaluators responded in this way. Compare Lidz, Mulvey, Appelbaum
& Cleveland, Commitment.· The Consistency of Clinicians and che Use of Legal Standards, 146 AM. J. PsY~~TRY 176 (1989) (in one carefully controlled test, clinicians did conform to the prevailing involuntary
~Vt! commitment law) .
See Chodoff, Involuntary Hospicalization of che Mencally Ill as a Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
38 4, 388 (1984); Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of che Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PsY~IIIATRy 496, 501 (1976); Lamb, lnvoluncary Tre_a tment for the !fomeless_ Mentally Ill, 4 NOTRE DAME
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4 4, at 120.
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(but apparently knowledgeable) medical colleague who reported, following amendments to Ontario's Mental Health Act, "Doctors will continue to certify those whom
they really believe should be certified. They will merely learn a new language." 70
It was, in part, attitudes such as these that had led Michael Saks to refer to such
witnesses as "imperial experts" who install themselves as "temporary monarchs"
by replacing a "societal preference" expressed "through the law and legal process
with [their] own preferences." 71 The same question surfaces similarly in a more
benign setting: Paul Appelbaum has noted how, given the "extremely nebulous"
standards set out in Social Security or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability
law, there is "strong temptation" for sympathetic evaluators to call a patient disabled
"even if that requires 'twisting the rules of justice and faimess."' 72 It should be
no surprise that such attitudes will likely lead to even more disproportionate forensic
imbalances.
These imbalances tum up in a variety of dual loyalty institutional settings. In
some cases, the "competitor" may be a mental health agency, an arm of state government, a private corporation, or a judicial agency. In each instance, the focus of
the competing institutional loyalty is slightly different, but the same questions need
to be asked:
Are clinicians unduly biased by agency? Do forensic experts engage in either
self-deception and/or conscious misrepresentation regarding whom they see
as the client? Does agency necessarily compromise objectivity?73
While some prominent and thoughtful mental health professionals have responded
nobly to the presence of this dilemma, 74 this issue appears to be "off the table"
for the purposes of most considerations of the forensic mental health system.
Finally, it should be intuitive that the tensions in these cases are increased once
the underlying matter actually reaches the courtroom. And yet, we have paid scant
attention to another important question: how do the courts feel about all of this?
Typically, they fluctuate radically from positions of total disinterest to extreme preoccupation. 75 However, if we consider the path of U.S. Supreme Court litigation
over the past seven years-from Barefoot v. Estelle (allowing a non-examining forensic
0

McCormick, Involuntary Commitment in Ontario: Some Barriers to the Provision of Proper Care, 124
CAN. MED. A.J. 715, 717 (1981) (emphasis added).
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Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291,294
& n .2 (1990) . See alsoM. Perlin, supra note 34, at 14-18.
72
Appelbaum, supra note 57, at 228.
73
Rogers, supra note 40, at 150. See also Anderten, Staulcup & Grisso, On Being Ethical in Legal Places,
11 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 764 (1980).
74
See, e.g., J. ROBITSCHER, supra note 29; J. ROBITSCHER, PuRsUIT OF AGREEMENT: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
(1966); S. HALLECK, supra note 30; Halleck supra note 45; B. BURSTEN, supra note 51; J. Monahan,
supra note 39; Rogers, supra note 40; Appelbaum, supra note 32; Appelbaum, supra note 57; Sadoff,
Practical Ethical Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist in Dealing with Attorneys, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 243 (1984); Weinstock, Perceptions of Ethical Problems by Forensic Psychiatrists, 17 BULL.
AM. ACAD . PSYCHIATRY & L. 189 (1989); Weinstock, Controversial Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry:
A Survey, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 176 (1988): Weinstock, Ethical Concerns Expressed by Forensic Psychiatrists,
31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 596 (1986). For a recent behavioral inquiry, see Hollien, The Expert Witness: Ethics
and Responsibilities, 35J. FORENSIC SCI. 1414 (1990).
"See Perlin, The Supreme Court, The Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random
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expert to testify as to future dangerousness in a death penalty case on the basis
of hypotheticals) 76 through the competency for execution cases77 to the recent
decision in Washington v. Harper (sharply limiting the right of a prisoner to refuse
78
the imposition of unwanted psychotropic medications) -we find that, notwithstanding some expressions of concern by several justices (usually in dissent), 79 the
Supreme Court, institutionally, is profoundly underwhelmed by these imbalances,
80
the resulting conflicts and the potential for serious exploitation ofpower.
This should not come as a major surprise. The Supreme Court's decisionmaking
in the relevant areas has developed largely "out of consciousness," and the Court
81
has regularly rejected all levels of psychodynamic explanation for personal behavior.
In the course of his opinions, the ChiefJustice has consistently revealed his discomfort
in having to deal with questions involving mental disability, especially when they
arise in forensic settings. 82 Myths and meta-myths saturate the relevant judicial opinions. 83 In short, we cannot look to the Supreme Court, as currently constituted,
to grant us much relief from the social dilemmas about which I have been speaking.

III. THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIPS
The public issues often at the center of the forensic relationship power struggle--the
publicized insanity acquittal, the death penalty dangerousness hearing, and the operational impact of the implementation of the right to refuse treatment on an institutionalized population-are largely missing in the therapeutic relationship. It is thus
perhaps easier to gloss over the underlying power imbalances that we still must
reconcile in the traditional, dyadic relationship between the mental health professional and her client. For that reason, it may thus be even more important that
We pay special attention to the subject.
In his monumental work, The Powers of Psychiatry, Jonas Robitscher was clear
in his critique of the alleged neutrality or value-freedom of the therapeutic relationship. A whole "constellation of values-personal, economic, political, philosophical,
;: 463 U.S. 880, 903-04 (1983) .
See supra note 54.
7
~ Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037-42 (1990) (state administrative rule adequately protected
n~t ~o refuse of convicted prisoner); compare id. at 1052 (S~evens, J., d_issenting) (sharply critiquing
m_aJonty opinion for inappropriately blending state interests m "_convenience prison administration"
With individual's therapeutic need for medication); see 2 M . Perhn, supra note 54, §5.64A, at 33-42
~1990 pocket part).
S ee generally Perlin supra note 75, at 81- 87 .
80
But see Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 986-90 (1990) (reflecting Supreme Court willingness
~o1 consider underlying issues in context of voluntary civil commitment admissions process).
~erlin, supra note 75, at 98 (discussing Supreme Court's reading of cases involving mentally disabled
~minal defendants); Perlin, supra note 52, at 731 (discussing this reading in the specific context of
insanity defense jurisprudence); id. at 673-706 (critiquing Court's ambivalence toward mental health
Pr_of~ssionals and the mental health professions through the filter of cases involving mentally disabled
~mmal defendants).
Id. at 713- 30; Perlin, supra note 75, at 82- 83. S ee, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U .S. 68, 83 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (right ofindigent criminal defendant to psychiatric assistance to present insanity
defense); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.~. 284, 2?7 (I 986) _(Rehnquist,~-• concurring) (disallowing
Use of defendant's silence in response to ~1ra~~a waivers as evidence of_ sam~); Colorado v. Connelly,
4 7? U.S. 157, 163-69 (I 987) (mental disab1hty not a factor to consider 10 determining validity of
f;!1randa waiver absent police misconduct).
Perlin, supra note 52, at 706-11 (d:scussing myths) .
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therapeutic-determines the treatment relationship," 84 Robitscher wrote, and it
is "foolish" for mental health professionals to claim that their disciplines are "objective and value free":
The purpose of the therapeutic encounter is to permit one person to have
enough effect on another person to change behavior and personality, and such
a situation is rife with values. . .. The values that psychiatrists provide for
their patients and for society are the most influential expressions of the great
authority that psychiatry exerts. 85
Seymour Halleck saw the power issue even more specifically, arguing that, by
participating in individual psychotherapy, a patient "regularly experiences either
a gain or a loss of power in relation to his family or friends, " 86 and that the "vectors"
in the therapy encounter that favor conformity "tend to be the most powerful. " 87
Here, Halleck and Robitscher were engaging primarily in a social critique rather
than a legal one (although they both acknowledged the degree to which behavioral
decisions by mental health professionals led to legal outcomes and implicated legal
standards). 88 But their concerns still help inform the way we must think about
this topic. Issues of power permeate the therapeutic relationship, albeit in more
subtle ways than they infect the forensic relationship. The fact that the therapeutic
relationship takes place regularly hidden from public view (in direct opposition to
the media saturation that sometimes accompanies forensic decision making) 89
should not obscure this fact.
Because the therapeutic relationship is a private one, and because therapy generally
takes place behind closed doors, the rest of society remains somewhat in the dark
as to what actually goes on, and as to what impact the underlying power imbalances
have over what transpires. For better or worse, one major source of data is that
of the reported caselaw: litigation is what happens, at least sometimes, when the
therapeutic relationship is perceived as severely infected.
If we try to turn to this as our database, we must begin by confronting an important
empirical reality. Notwithstanding the general perception of a "litigation explosion"
(a perception that is deeply flawed on a variety of important levels), 90 the reality
is that the incidence of civil malpractice suits against mental health professionals
remains substantially lower than rates for other medical specialities,9 1 a variance
84
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Id. at 400.
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that is reflected in the comparatively "minuscule" insurance rate increases in the
mental health professions (as compared to other branches of health care). 92
Many reasons have been offered to explain this low rate. Speculations have focused
on the general reluctance of the tort law to provide remedies for emotional injuries,
the difficulty in proving the applicable standard of care and the existence of a causal
relationship between the breach of the standard and the alleged injury, the stigma
that patients fear might result from making public their psychiatric history, the reluctance to sue as a result of a patient's emotional tie to the mental health professional
and/or the patient's feeling that psychotherapy could not succeed without the therapist's full cooperation, the inability on the part of many patients either to formulate
clear expectations for the result of their treatment or to assess the "success" of
their results, the ability of trained mental health professionals to deal therapeutically
With patient hostility and thus avoid suit, the frequency with which many patients
see mental health professionals, and the fact that psychiatry and psychology remain
somewhat enigmatic to a significant percentage of the trial bar. 93
We are now learning some important data, as to why some patients choose to
sue over the "violation of expectations" 94 that leads to malpractice litigation. Recent
empirical studies suggest that the decision to file suit is related positively to patient
assertiveness, to the patient's ability to engage in strategic formulations, and to
the involvement and discernment of a "broad audience network" (actors external
to the relationship between dissatisfied patients and doctors), and is related negatively
to such factors as the patient's evaluation (prior to the precipitating grievance) of
the doctor's competence, to the doctor's show of concern for the patient's "state
in life," and, interestingly, to the patient's degree of knowledge about the work
ofboth health and legal professionals (i.e., those with greater knowledge about either,
sue less). 95
In addition, there is now some significant external evidence that this "most favored
nation" 96 status is now changing. In recent years, the law has become generally
more receptive to allegations of emotional injury, ex-patients have openly and candidly discussed their treatment experiences (thus perhaps lessening the stigma of
treatment for others), the "explosion" in litigation on behalf of the institutionalized
mentally disabled has sensitized judges and litigators to some of the underlying
substantive issues, and more has been learned about what happens empirically when
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certain treatments are employed. 97 Yet, many of the explanations of the still-lower
relative rate of litigation can still be traced to the power imbalances inherent in
the therapeutic relationship: the stigma resulting from publicizing a "failed" therapy
encounter, impact of the transference phenomenon on reluctance to sue, feelings
of patient-generated self-blame for therapy "failures," and the skill with which many
mental health professionals can sidestep hostility by deftly shifting the focus of therapeutic encounters. 98 ·
Still as we know, important cases involving therapeutic relationships have been
litigated. It is also likely that the public's use of the availability heuristic 99 significantly inflates perceptions of both the frequency and the precedential impact of
such cases. For both empirical and instrumental reasons, then, it is important that
we look at some of these areas of litigation in an effort to evaluate the extent to
which they are permeated by power imbalance issues. I want thus to consider briefly
three specific problems that may stem from the sort of boundary violation 100 that
accompanies power imbalance: litigation based on improper treatment (including
drug reactions), 101 litigation based on improper sexual conduct and/or attempts to
financially manipulate clients, 102 and litigation that arises from perceived violations
of confidentiality, especially with regard to the type of "third party" protection or
warning that was present in the Tarsoff case. 103
First, it should be intuitive that the improper administration of medication is
a 'potential minefield.' 104 Beyond the problems posed by neurological side-effects
such as tardive dyskinesia, 105 liability issues can arise in a variety of medicationrelated settings:
[A]bsence of an adequate history, physical examination, and laboratory examination prior to treatment, prescription of a drug where it is not indicated, prescription of the wrong dosage, prescription of medication for inappropriately
short or long time periods, failure to recognize, monitor or treat side-effects

97

3M. PERLIN, supra note 54, §12 .02, at 6-7; see also B. FURROW, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHIATRY (1980);
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or toxicity failure to abate the possibility of drug reactions or interactions,
and failure to consult with the necessary experts. 106
While there still have been few decisions in this area, 101 the scant litigation that
has been reported reflects some of the issues inherent in power imbalances. For
example, there have been instances of doctors who prescribed a 50-day supply of
Valium without taking a medical history or checking the patient's medical records, 108
Who failed to change a prescription following his observation of side-effects and
the onset of self-destructive behavior on the part of the patient, 109 or who prescribed
addictive drugs so as to help the patient see the nature of his addictive personality. 110
It is not clear whether the therapists' actions stemmed simply from sloppy medical
Practice ("negligence" in the true sense of the word), whether they resulted from
a failure to take patients' individual needs into account, or something else.
When one reads some of the cases in this area carefully, one can almost discern
111
~ Pattern: the defendant-perhaps employing "typification" -"slots" his patients
112
into certain categories, and prescribes a similar regimen for all. Such a pattern
reflects precisely the kind of power imbalance that Robitscher and Halleck warned
about. 113
Second, the sexual misconduct cases 114 are probably the most pernicious since
CI) while there is no question that such behavior by a therapist is "always unethi115
~al, "
(2) surveys suggest that between I 0% and 17% of therapists have engaged
1
n such behavior with their clients, 116 and (3) the fact settings by their very nature
reflect a severe power imbalance. 117 Three cases have been well publicized in this
regard. In Roy v. Hartogs, 118 the court upheld a damage award to a patient whose
Psychiatrist engaged in sexual intercourse with her, claiming that it was a legitimate
Pan of therapy; in Zipkin v. Freeman, 119 an award was upheld when the therapist
Persuaded his patient to swim with him in the nude, leave her husband, and invest
her money in business ventures that he controlled; in Landau v. Werner, 120 a verdict
Was similarly affirmed when a therapist, after explaining the transference phenome-
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121
non
to a patient who had told him she had fallen in love with him, began to
date the patient and discussed the possibility of vacationing together.
In all of these instances-as well as others less notorious 122-the patient remains
vulnerable to and susceptible to the influence and suggestion of the therapist. 123
As time continues, as revelations of similar improper sexual contacts increase, and
as we confront the reality that the vast majority of therapists self-report a feeling
of sexual attraction to'their clients, 124 we can expect a proliferation of"sexual misconduct" litigation. In virtually every instance, the power imbalances inherent in the
therapeutic relationship will be at the core of the litigation.
Finally, the confidentiality cases must be seen through two different prisms: those
cases that arise from a breach of a mental health professional's failure to maintain
secrecy regarding a disclosure made to him directly by a patient (about the patient
herself), 125 and those that stem from an inquiry into the professional's duty to protect .
others as a result of information given by the patient in which there is a question
as to whether or not a third party might be in danger, the so-called Tarasoff exception.126
The first grouping of cases implicate statutory rights (in those jurisdictions where
there is an operative psychotherapist-patient privilege), 127 contractual rights 128 and
constitutional rights (where the right to privacy is given such content). 129 The right
to confidentiality, of course, is not absolute. In addition to the Tarasoff cases (where
there is a judicially or legislatively imposed duty to warn or protect a third party
of potential danger), 130 there are exceptions inherent in the forensic relationship, 131
in cases where the patient puts his mental state in issue affirmatively in litigation, 132
and in cases where there is a conflict between confidentiality and a police power
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relationship and which can deprive the patient of her independent judgment and ability to distinguish the reality of her interaction with the analyst and vice versa.
The "transference neurosis" is explained and discussed in R. BALSAM & A. BALSAM, BECOMING A
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122
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300 S.E.2d 833 (1983); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984); Matter of Schroeder,
415 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. den ., (Jan. 23, 1988); Block v. Ambach, 140 A.D.2d 814,
528 N .Y.S.2d 204 (1988), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 323,537 N.E.2d 1181, 540 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1989).
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statute (such as one governing civil commitment or child abuse reporting). 133
Nevertheless, the policy's rationale rests finally on a power issue: disclosure of confidential communications might well "deter persons from seeking needed assistance,
or from making the full disclosure on which diagnosis and treatment depends. " 134
The Tarasoff paradigm actually more closely parallels the issues raised in considering forensic relationships. Since courts and legislatures have carved out a confidentia!ity exception, the question remains: how will therapists respond to the externally
imposed duty to breach confidentiality? A variety of sensitive solutions has been
suggested. Loren Roth and Alan Meisel, for instance, have listed five guidelines
to govern Tarasoff situations: (1) prudence to avoid being "stampeded" into giving
unnecessary warnings; (2) provision of information as to the limits of confidentiality
Prior to the entry into the therapeutic relationship; (3) the use of various "social
and environmental manipulations" prior to being forced to compromise confidentiality (such as bringing third parties into the therapeutic setting); (4) obtaining
Patients' permission (wherever possible) prior to disclosure of confidential information, and disclosing such information in the patient's presence; and (5) assessing
any such intervention in light of its potential impact on future therapy and in light
of the likelihood that it will be successful in preventing future violence. 135 Again,
these suggestions implicitly reflect the problems raised by power imbalances in the
therapeutic/forensic relationship.

IV. CONCLUSION
I-laving said this, it is necessary to also acknowledge some extraordinarily important
additional truths:
·
. -Courts are suspicious of and generally reject psychodynamic explanations of
interpersonal behavior, as being inherently dissonant with the "free will" basis of
·
the criminal justice and tort systems. 136
-Much legal decisionmaking can best be explained by (1) a study of the types
of simplifying heuristics that frequently lead to distorted and systematically erroneous
decisions through ignoring or misusing of rationally useful information, 137 and (2)

13,-:----------------------------------¼ See, e.g., C?mmonwealth ex rel. Plattv. Platt, 266 Pa. ~uper, ~76, 404A.2d4~0 (1979) (commitment);
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an examination of the way that "ordinary common sense" unconsciously animates
decisionmakers. 138
-Judges are profoundly teleological in their use of social science and behavioral
evidence in their decisionmaking, a factor that tends to further debase and trivialize
scientific research, data and discourse. 139
-Jurors are overwhelmingly ambivalent about all of the underlying concepts:
the role of mental health expert testimony in the court process, mental disability
as an animating explanation for behavior, the efficacy of therapy, the proper balance
that must be struck between professional autonomy, public safety and privacy, and
jurors' decisionmaking similarly reflects the use of heuristic reasoning devices and
"ordinary common sense. " 140
-As a result of these conflicts and ambivalences, legal decisionmakers, like the
rest of us, exhibit cognitive dissonance (the reinterpretation of information and experience that conflicts with their internally accepted or publicly stated beliefs so as
to avoid the unpleasant state that such inconsistencies produce) 14 1 in the way they
deal with the substantive issues under consideration.
These final thoughts are not meant to be nihilistic, but to simply accentuate the
difficulty · of resolving the underlying issues. We must consciously "unpack the
myths" 142 and "strip the facade" 143 from the stereotypical ways that vivid, heuristic
evidence is presented 144-in legal forums, in mental health forums and in public
forums-to consider the power imbalance issues that underlie each of these relationships. This must be done consciously and openly ifwe are to illuminate-and attempt
to resolve-the core questions that concern us.
138
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